Brian Leiter is Karl N. Llewellyn Professor of Jurisprudence and Director of the Center for Law, Philosophy, & Human Values at the University of Chicago. He works on a variety of topics in moral, political, and legal philosophy. His current Nietzsche-related work concerns Nietzsche's theory of agency and its intersection with recent work in empirical psychology; Nietzsche's arguments for moral skepticism; and the role of naturalism in Nietzsche's philosophy.
Just a pedantic note, since it doesn't really diminish the thrust of your point:
>> But the issue addressed by the doctrine of eternal recurrence is precisely "secular redemption" from meaningless suffering (not the "rational justification" of "intellectual authority"), as Nietzsche makes clear when he returns to Zarathustra at the conclusion of the Third Essay of On the Genealogy of Morality. <<
Haven't you here conflated the final section of the Third Treatise (which explicitly addresses "meaningless suffering") with the final two sections of the Second Treatise (only the last of which expressly invokes Zarathustra)?
Yes, you're correct that the explicit Zarathustra reference is at the end of GM II, while the reference to the problem of meaningless suffering is in GM III. But the Nietzsche alternative to the latter problem is, I take it (and as I argued in my book), the doctrine of eternal recurrence, which is, of course, Zarathustra's central teaching--hence the conflation.
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