tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-4373556239088388790.post4374371228824892550..comments2023-11-30T06:32:59.453-06:00Comments on Brian Leiter's Nietzsche Blog: More on Katsafanas on Nietzsche, Consciousness, and AgencyBrian Leiterhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/08749548844483929392noreply@blogger.comBlogger7125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-4373556239088388790.post-74625141603700399952010-12-05T07:40:07.287-06:002010-12-05T07:40:07.287-06:00Some recent psychological data:
Nothing indicate...Some recent <a href="http://www.psy.fsu.edu/~masicampo/CsnsCauseBehAnnRvw.pdf" rel="nofollow">psychological data</a>:<br /><br /><i>Nothing indicated motivations originating in consciousness — instead, conscious thoughts interacted with existing motivations.</i> [...] <i>There are two forms of the view that consciousness is an epiphenomenon. One is that all conscious processes lack causal Robhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/10546265581296919974noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-4373556239088388790.post-88365904150325338572010-11-28T15:24:01.351-06:002010-11-28T15:24:01.351-06:00On the final point: as I argued in the "Who ...On the final point: as I argued in the "Who is the Sovereign Individual?" paper, it certainly seems right that N. thinks there is a difference between "unified" or "coherent" agents and "disunified" or "incoherent" ones (though the metaphors are frustratingly vague, even in N.). There I raised the question what any of this has to do with "Brian Leiterhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/08749548844483929392noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-4373556239088388790.post-66195695653284099292010-11-28T15:20:43.411-06:002010-11-28T15:20:43.411-06:00Paul, an initial, and overdue response, to your co...Paul, an initial, and overdue response, to your comments, above. On your case #2, this gets it right:<br /><br />"perhaps Brian is only denying that causally _autonomous_ choices are possible. That is, perhaps the point is just that although case (2) is possible, the conscious choice is going to be causally determined (by facts about the agent’s non-conscious states, environment, and Brian Leiterhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/08749548844483929392noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-4373556239088388790.post-80028399003758814972010-08-04T14:58:31.409-06:002010-08-04T14:58:31.409-06:00(continued, comment #3)
Now, traditional accounts...(continued, comment #3)<br /><br />Now, traditional accounts of the controlled/non-controlled distinction rely on claims that are incompatible with the psychological data. For example, as Brian has shown, the psychological data is incompatible with libertarian conceptions of control. So Nietzsche certainly couldn’t accept any account of agential control that had libertarian presuppositions. InPaul Katsafanashttp://sites.google.com/site/paulkatsafanas/noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-4373556239088388790.post-34438133195901662302010-08-04T14:57:34.015-06:002010-08-04T14:57:34.015-06:00(continued, comment #2)
(2) Bill’s sex drive disp...(continued, comment #2)<br /><br />(2) Bill’s sex drive disposes him to engage in sexual activity. He thinks about Sarah and Samantha, and decides that he’d rather pursue a relationship Sarah. His conscious _choice_ to pursue a relationship with Sarah interacts with this drive. Being with Sarah is the object of the drive. <br /><br />The difference between case (1) and case (2) is minor: in Paul Katsafanashttp://sites.google.com/site/paulkatsafanas/noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-4373556239088388790.post-54577016085723011552010-08-04T14:56:12.012-06:002010-08-04T14:56:12.012-06:00Thanks to Brian for his insightful and informative...Thanks to Brian for his insightful and informative reply. In the above post, Brian claims that conscious perceptions can play a causal role in action. In particular, conscious perceptions can supply the drive’s object, though they can’t alter its aim. On these claims, I think Brian and I are largely in agreement. <br /><br />However, there are two points on which I think there may be some Paul Katsafanashttp://sites.google.com/site/paulkatsafanas/noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-4373556239088388790.post-4686557731057982842010-07-30T22:30:58.457-06:002010-07-30T22:30:58.457-06:00I think Nietzsche thinks that we can be responsibl...I think Nietzsche thinks that we can be responsible. But we are not responsible for the reason that Christianity gives us. Christianity says that we are free and that <i>being a free agent</i> is required for being morally responsible. You must be free in order to be considered responsible. So when Nietzsche says something to the extent, 'we are not free, therefore, we are not morally Narzisshttps://www.blogger.com/profile/07790559536240659752noreply@blogger.com